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The main objective of the following study is to introduce readers to the issue of 
the 2nd National Scientific Conference in the series “Atypical Employment Relations” organized 
on 3 October 2019 by the Centre for Atypical Employment Relations of the University of Lodz. 
The consequence of extending the right of coalition to persons performing paid work outside the 
employment relationship was that they were guaranteed important collective rights, which until 
1 January 2019 were reserved primarily for employees. The rights which Polish legislator ensured 
to non-employees include the right to equal treatment in employment due to membership in a trade 
union or performing trade union functions; the right to bargain with a view to the conclusion of 
collective agreement and other collective agreements; the right to bargain to resolve collective 
disputes and the right to organize strikes and other forms of protest, as well as the right to protect 
union activists. The author positively assesses the extension of collective rights to people engaged in 
gainful employment outside the employment relationship, noting a number of flawsand shortcomings 
of the analyzed norms. The manner of regulating this matter, through the mechanism of referring 
to the relevant provisions regulating the situation of employees, the statutory equalization of the 
scope of collective rights of non-employees with the situation of employees, the lack of criteria 
differentiating these rights, as well as the adopted model of trade union representation based on 
company trade unions, not taking into account the specific situation of people working for profit
outside the employment relationship, are the reasons why the amendment to the trade union law is 
seen critically and requires further changes.
right of coalition, persons engaged in gainful employment outside employment 
relationship, non-employees, collective employment law, trade union.
* University of Lodz, Department of Labour Law; tduraj@wpia.uni.lodz.pl
1 The article was prepared as part of a project financed by the National Science Centre in Po-
land pursuant to the decision number DEC-2018/29/B/HS5/02534. The project’s registration number
is: 2018/29/B/HS5/02534.
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“IT IS A NOMOS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE LAW”:  
ON ANARCHY AND THE LAW
Abstract. The relationship between anarchy and the law is, to say the least, an uncomfortable 
one. The so-called ‘classical’ anarchist position – in all its heterogeneous tendencies – is, usually, 
characterised by a total opposition against the law. However and despite its invaluable contribution 
and the ever-pertinent critique of the state of affairs, this ‘classical’ anarchist position needs to be 
re-examined and rearticulated if it is to pose an effective nuisance to the current (and much complex) 
mechanisms of domination and the oppression of dogmatism and dominance of the law. Taking 
into account the aforementioned challenges, in this article, I examine and develop two notions of 
the philosophical thought of Gilles Deleuze, namely that of the institution and that of the nomos 
of the nomads. In doing so, I aim to think anew the relationship between anarchy and the law and, 
ultimately, to point towards an ethico-political account, of what I shall call an an-archic nomos 
which escapes (or, at least, tries to) the dogmatism and “archist” mentality of the law.
Keywords: Anarchy, law, nomos, institutions, Deleuze.
„JEST TO NOMOS BARDZO RÓŻNY OD PRAWA”:  
O ANARCHII I PRAWIE
Streszcz nie. Relacja pomiędzy narchią a prawem jest, delikatni  mówiąc, iewygodna. 
Tak zwane „klas czne” stanowisko anarchistyczne – w wszystkich jego heterogenicznych
t ndencjach – charakte yzuje się zazwyczaj całkowitym sprzeciwem wobec prawa. Jednakże, 
pomimo swojego n eocenionego wkładu i ieustannie aktu l ej krytyki stanu rzeczy, ta „klasyczna”
pozycja anarchistyczna musi zostać ponownie zbadana i ponow ie wyartykułowana, jeśli ma 
stanowić skuteczną przeszkodę dla obecnych (i bardzo złożonych) mechanizmów dominacji 
i opresji dogmatyzmu i dominacji prawa. Biorąc pod uwagę powyższe wyzwania, w niniejszym 
artykule analizuję i rozwijam dwa pojęcia myśli filozoficznej Gilles’a Deleuze’a, a mianowicie 
pojęcie instytucji oraz pojęcie nomosu nomadów. W ten sposób chcę na nowo przemyśleć 
relację między anarchią a prawem i ostatecznie wskazać na etyczno-polityczne ujęcie tego, co 
nazywam an-archicznym nomosem, który wymyka się (lub przynajmniej próbuje) dogmatyzmowi 
i „archistycznej” mentalności prawa.
Słowa klucz we: anarchia, prawo, nomos, instytucje, Deleuze.
* University of Kent; c.marneros@kent.ac.uk 
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On the breaking of this cycle
maintained by mythical forms of law,
on the suspension of law
with all the forces on which it depends as they depend on it,
finally therefore on the abolition of state power,
a new historical epoch is founded.
Walter Benjamin1
1. INTRODUCTION
If the law, but also, laws and rights more generally, are susceptible to what it 
could be seen as a systemic dogmatism in the sense that they can be understood 
as a transcendent authority that dictates and imposes hierarchising rules of and 
over living – in the sense of an archē [ἀρχή],2 that is, as a monocular prism of 
rightness upon a multiplicity of modes of being, acting effectively as “a limitation 
of actions” (Deleuze 2007, 19) – of what is possible, then we have to remain able 
to ask within and beyond the auspices of legal theory: is it possible to even think 
in terms of an an-archic (without an archē) mode of being, that is an ethos which 
thinks and does politics beyond the dogmatism and the commands of the law, 
laws and rights? Furthermore, how are we to respond to the usual protestation of 
(legal) authority and, especially, the view that understands the law as a universal 
framework of fundamental legality, and especially so when it is often admitted 
that it ‘may not be perfect’, but the law is ‘the only’ or ‘the most socially efficient’ 
way to be and to act? 
In this article, considering the aforementioned aporias, I aim to think in terms 
of and point towards an ethico-political account of, what I shall call, an an-archic 
nomos [νόμος], which is influenced by, but also tries to develop further, Gilles 
Deleuze’s understanding of the term, nomos of the nomads. Such an account aims 
to think beyond the law and think anew our relation with laws and rights, more 
generally. I should stress, however, that my intention is not to provide a definite 
answer, as a sort of better ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of legalism a ‘manifesto’ or 
‘programme’. I argue that an examination of Deleuze’s understanding of nomos 
(and his thought more broadly) has something interesting to offer to an ethos that 
tries to live immanently and do politics in an an-anarchic way, which escapes 
1 Benjamin 1986, 300.
2 The term archē means ‘to be the origin’, or to be prior to something, thus it is used here 
to signify the foundational principle, the beginning of everything that succeeds it. It can also have 
the meaning of ‘a command’. It could be seen that both meanings have a close connection to a no-
tion of the law as a dogmatic, archist principle that commands our modes of being. See: Agamben 
2019.
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the dogmatism of the law, laws and rights at least in their transcendent modality.3 
I should also stress that my choice to employ and to continue to use a term which 
is broadly understood as a juridical one, nomos in order to schematically describe 
my account does not suggest any sort of reconciliation of anarchic thought with 
the law, or any other form of recognition of an emancipatory promise, in a more 
‘progressive’ more ‘inclusive’ theorisation of the law. It is rather an examination 
of how we can create different potentialities of life, which refuse to get captured 
within the dogmatism of a transcendent, moralising mode of a juridicalised being. 
To that extent, the use of a juridical term to signify a non-juridical ethos (or, in 
better terms, a non-juridicalised life) manifests a paradox and an irony which 
remains open to ponder on. 
In what follows then, we shall start our examination by a brief exploration 
of the so-called blackmail of the law and the ‘classical anarchist’ responses to it 
(Section 1). Consequently, I ponder on the aforementioned modalities of such an 
an-archic nomos as centrally formed by two Deleuzian notions: the institution 
(Section 2) and the nomos of the nomads (Section 3). By placing these two 
notions in direct opposition to the dogmatism of the law, laws and rights, I aim 
to think beyond and escape the capture of the dogmatism of the archist mentality 
of the law.
2. ON LAW’S BLACKMAIL AND ‘CLASSICAL’ ANARCHIST RESPONSES
Law’s dogmatic mentality operates with the use of a powerful blackmail. 
According to this blackmail, any form of criticism that points towards the 
overreach of law’s universal framework of human values runs the risk of 
embracing an always-already characterised liminal situation where the 
absence of the law, laws or rights will signify the beginning of a much more 
chaotic outcome; akin to that where “the violent anarchy of the state of 
nature” (Newman 2012, 308), a kind of Hobbesian state of Warre, will become 
unstoppable and, as a result, life will become “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short” (Hobbes 1986, 186). This is especially pertinent when law claims 
3 I do not aim to argue that Deleuze himself was an anarchist and I am not interested in such 
mundane discussions which are trying to present an image of an author in order to serve certain 
political and non-political (or mere ‘gossiping’) purposes. I, simply, want to argue that Deleuze’s 
thought may have something interesting to offer to the efforts to (re)think anarchy in terms of an 
ethos and a related politics. This is, of course, not a radically novel view, with Deleuze’s relation 
to anarchy and his huge, direct or indirect, influence on many theorists of anarchy, anarchist group 
and movements being well-known. In fact, only within the last year, an edited collection on De-
leuze and anarchism also a lexicon of anarchic concepts, which places Deleuze within the broader 
anarchist tradition were published. See respectively, Gray van Heerden and Eloff (2019) and Colson 
(2019).
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to operate as something akin to what Carl Schmitt saw as the formation of 
a Christian Empire (or what we can call a moral Empire of the West). In other 
words, as a Katechon [Kατέχον], a restraint of the coming of the Antichrist 
– and, we could add, the coming of an-archy (Schmitt 2006, 59–62). While 
this view is problematic for various reasons that are not the central subject 
of my interest here, it remains of relevance since this ‘sense’ appears to have 
managed to influence, to a significant extent whether explicitly or implicitly, 
a large proportion of theoretical scholarship on law and authority more broadly. 
For example, we, usually, read of an explicit or implicit established by now 
belief that the law and a wider notion of being governed by ‘law and order’, or 
what, the French collective of radical philosophers, Tiqqun, call ‘Empire’, are 
“the crowning achievement of a civilisation, the end-point of its ascendant arc” 
(Tiqqun 2010, 127) and so forth. Perhaps, it is this successful fearmongering-
consensus-building in the name of defence against a, supposed, chaotic 
aftermath, if anyone was to doubt the universality, effectiveness or even the 
particular ways in which the values of law are procured and defended, that 
has led critics to be careful enough to avoid unleashing a, potentially, more 
powerful or, as it is tellingly termed, ‘total’ critique that questions, for good 
reasons, the very notion of a mode of thought that thinks that thought itself is 
now only possible within this legalistic or juridical framework. 
In addition, it could be further speculated that, perhaps, the dominance of 
archē as a modality (grounding and thus, enabling law or right on the basis of some 
higher law etc.) and its morality-coding have rendered any thinking otherwise an 
extremely difficult, if not at times institutionally impossible and unwelcome task. 
Such a mode of archist thinking hierarchises among and above beings and ideas 
and has contributed to an understanding of the law as a framework-concept above 
human experience, or as a value of values that – despite any flaws – represents 
something which can be defined as ‘the good’ itself or the mark of ‘the civilised’, 
once more above the level of the immanent experience of values. Nonetheless, this 
is beside the point ultimately, since this ‘overthinking’ in itself about any future 
potential repercussions of a life beyond the law does not have anything to say 
about the present and thus it tends, in itself, to be an uncreative and reactive 
over-investment. 
Moreover, we need to ponder on the (im)possibility of thinking and using 
terms that are infused by a strong historical juridical sense (such as nomos), in 
order to point towards a non-dogmatic, an-archic ethos and way of thinking. 
Such a potential becomes even more difficult if we additionally consider that the 
relationship between the law and anarchy tends to be characterised, to say the 
least, as an uncomfortable one. Taking a purely negative approach towards the law, 
anarchist thought – in all its heterogeneous tendencies – is, usually, characterised 
by a total opposition against the law, which tends to be understood as an irrational, 
immoral and oppressive ‘tool’ of the state apparatus that promotes the interests of 
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the government against, and not for, its subjects.4 The law has the ability to justify 
the obligation of the people to adhere to the rules of the state and to that extent, it 
justifies the state’s monopoly of violence – “state behaviour is an act of violence, 
and it calls its violence ‘legal right’; that of the individual, ‘crime,’” writes Max 
Stirner5 (2017, 209). These views are, famously, echoed by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
when he states: “Laws! We know what they are and what they are worth. Gossamer 
for the mighty and the rich, fetters that no steel could smash for the little people 
and the poor, fishing nets in the hands of government” (2005, 90). But beyond 
being an “unworthy hoax” (Bakunin 1964, 136) that justifies and legalises the 
‘brutish’ acts of the state, the law becomes also an insurmountable barrier that 
fetters any potentiality towards living a life characterised by spontaneity and 
revolt against hierarchy; and to that extent, it limits and at times terminates the 
ability of human beings to confront their immanent everyday problems and resolve 
them according to the particular and singular needs of a situation that they are 
faced with, without being attached to the commands of the laws of the state or 
‘enabled’ in principle but, simultaneously, hindered in reality. According to Pyotr 
Kropotkin, people become
perverted by an education which from infancy seeks to kill in [them] the spirit of revolt and 
to develop that of submission to authority; we are so perverted by this existence under the 
ferrule of a law, which regulates every event in life – our birth, our education, our development, 
our love, our friendship – that, if this state of things continues, we shall lose all initiative, all 
habit of thinking for ourselves. (Kropotkin 1975, 27)
To that extent, people are unable to respond, engage, create and think 
otherwise because they expect to receive all the answers to their problems from an 
archist authority of the law of the state, or adapt to the modality that one thing will 
be valid in the name of a higher abstract principle (in this case law) but another 
will be valid in everyday reality.6 
4 Mikhail Bakunin even suggests that a main characteristic that defines someone as an ‘anar-
chist’ is the demand for the absolute abolition of juridical law. As he states in Bakunin 1964, 271: 
“The Negation of Juridical Law: In a word, we reject all legislation – privileged, licensed, official, 
and legal – and all authority, and influence, even though they may emanate from universal suffrage, 
for we are convinced that it can turn only to the advantage of a dominant minority of exploiters 
against the interests of the vast majority in subjection to them. It is in this sense that we are really 
Anarchists.”
5 Individualist or egoist, anarchist tendencies, anarcho-nihilists and insurrectionists’ affinity 
to ‘illegalism’, in the pure sense of the term, is manifested by direct, insurrectional acts against the 
laws of the state. Such acts are considered by these tendencies to be the only answer to the oppres-
sion of the law. For examples of these tendencies and their relation or non-relation to the law, see: 
Anonymous 2011; Landstreicher 2009; Feral Faun 2010; Serafinski 2016; Bonanno 2009.
6 The similarity between this view and the way that Deleuze criticises the law is striking. For 
Deleuze, the law signifies a return to transcendent or archist values, which are uncreative, leading 
to a fettering and blocking of other possibilities of thinking about and resisting oppression.
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In the remainder of his “Law and Authority” essay, Kropotkin explains how 
we became so accustomed to obedience and the need for ever-expanding laws 
that we cannot do without them. Thus, we accept any restraint to our freedom 
in the name of security, in the name of avoiding what Hobbes understood as 
the ‘threat’ of the state of nature, leading to the ultimate pacification of our 
social and political instincts and the degradation of our spirit of revolt. This 
leads Kropotkin to suggest that the only viable solution is the total destruction 
of the juridical system and the law. As he characteristically writes: “No more 
laws! No more judges! Liberty, equality, and practical human sympathy are 
the only effectual barriers we can oppose to the anti-social instincts of certain 
amongst us”7 (Kropotkin 1975, 43). Despite its invaluable contribution and 
the ever-pertinent critique of the state of affairs, this ‘classical’ – if it can be 
named so – anarchist dismissive approach to law needs to be re-examined 
and rearticulated if it is to pose an effective nuisance to the mechanisms of 
domination and the oppression of dogmatism and dominance under an archist 
mode of being. This is a because, a head-on confrontation with the law and the 
state – a potential for a general insurrection – does not appear like a pragmatic, 
or even an effective solution due to the blurry meanings of the law and the state 
and the overcomplicated relations that characterise our (post)modern societies, 
including the difficulty of defining and identifying the boundaries of the state 
and its law.8 Perhaps, it is the recognition of this impasse that led, more recently, 
to the emergence of works that tries to think ‘seriously’ about the law and its 
relationship with anarchy in new and interesting ways, including analyses about 
how questions relating to a living of a life beyond law and the state can be placed 
in a different sense ‘compatible’ with an anarchic ethos.9 In what follows, I aim 
to contribute to this discussion by (re)visiting the Deleuzian concepts of the 
‘institutions’ and the nomos of the nomads.
7 The similarity between Kropotkin’s contempt for the judges and the judgmental mode of 
thinking of the law of the state and Deleuze’s appeal not to leave the jurisprudential operation 
to judges Deleuze is striking (1995, 169).
8 Giorgio Agamben (1993, 84) is right when he states in The Coming Community that “the 
novelty of the coming [here we can add anarchic] politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for 
the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), 
an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organisation.” Following 
this line of thought it could be argue that anarchic politics, if they are to be effective, need to focus 
more on how to form an ethos that escapes the dogmatic, moralising judgment of the state – of 
creating new ways of existing that slips away from state’s capture. I will support, further, this view 
in the subsequent sections where I explain Deleuze’s use of the term nomos to oppose the law of 
the state.
9 See, for example, the works of Lozidiou (2011; 2018; 2019), Newman (2012) and Tamblyn 
(2019).
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3. INSTITUTIONS AGAINST THE LAW
In his first major work, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s 
Theory of Human Nature, Deleuze makes a distinction between the law and 
institutions. Following, David Hume’s critique of the idea of a society based 
on ‘a social contract’, Deleuze states that:
The essence of society is not the law but rather the institution. The law, in fact, is a limitation 
of enterprise and action, and it focuses only on a negative aspect of society. The fault of 
contractual theories is that they present us with a society whose essence is the law, that 
is, with a society that has no other objective than to guarantee certain pre-existing natural 
rights and no other origin than the contract. Thus, anything positive is taken away from the 
social, and instead the social is saddled with negativity, limitation and alienation. The entire 
Humean critique of the state of nature, natural rights, and the social contract amounts to 
the suggestion that the problem must be reversed […] The institution, unlike the law, is not 
a limitation but rather a model of actions, a veritable enterprise, an invented system of 
positive means or a positive invention of indirect means. (Deleuze 1991, 46–47)
In this passage, we observe a distinction between an idea of the law and that 
of an institution with the first said to be operating as a mere limitation of actions, 
a restraint. This idea of the law suggests that the people that create ‘a society’ form 
– and are formed by – a social contract based on a fundamental sense of law that
places restraints on the ‘brutish’ impulses and passions which would be harmful 
to the rest of the population in the absence of such a contractual bond, very much 
akin to Hobbes’ views which were noted above. Deleuze, via Hume, argues that 
a notion of the institution is quite the opposite of the law, in the sense that the 
institution is something that operates as ‘a model of actions’ that is characterised 
by a positive invention and, in that sense, it does not limit action but expands 
the possibilities of a wider range of actions and responses to the multiplicity of 
encounters one is faced with each time – the institution is a sort of an enterprise, 
which is ever-changing, and hence it cannot bind and restrain. Institutions are 
created in order to “satisfy [their] tendencies and needs”10 (Deleuze 2007, 19) and 
they are ultimately dissolved or changed if such needs are redundant. Hence, the 
importance of the distinction between the law and institutions is, for the purposes 
of this article, that thinking through or with institutions rather than the law, in the 
sense described above, enables a different perspective about thinking the social, 
an an-archic way as I shall explain below, which is “profoundly creative, inventive 
and positive” (Lefebvre 2008, 54).
10 A parallel line could be drawn between the function of an institution and that of the phi-
losophical concept (Deleuze, Guattari 1994) with the former functioning at a practical level (for 
example, how to organise in order to respond to a particular, political/social issue) whereas the 
latter responds to problems of thought. In both situations, however, institutions and concepts are 
ever-changing and thus, an-archic and non-dogmatic as they do not prioritise any of their parts 
over the others.
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Despite not expanding further on this distinction, it seems that Deleuze held 
a fairly consistent approach to it. For instance, in his later book on Leopold von 
Sacher-Masoch, Coldness and Cruelty, Deleuze states that “laws bind actions; 
they immobilise and moralise them” (1991, 78). To that extent, the law operates 
through the imposition of certain transcendent or archist action-binding values; 
classically through the distinction of good and evil, right and wrong, judging 
actions by hierarchising beings in terms of these actions. In contrast, Deleuze 
remarks that “pure institutions without laws would by definition be models of free, 
an-archic action, in perpetual motion, in permanent revolution, in a constant state 
of immorality”11 (Deleuze 1991, 78, [emphasis added]). 
An institution can be said to be envisaged as an open-ended, nomadic space, 
as I explain below, where we can find each other (The Invisible Committee 2009, 
97) and create with each other. It is a way of responding to a particular situation
not because we are a priori commanded by archist norms (legal, or moral), 
but because a situation calls us to create something that is capable to respond 
to a singular need of the transformation of the social. Further to that, an institution 
should not operate just as a ‘space’ where we find each other, but as one where 
we have the capability of losing each other, of losing or changing the institutions 
themselves and through our practices – which are never predetermined – losing 
our own selves and whatever we held as a dogmatic notion of truth and norms. 
What is meant by that is that an institution is also “an indication of a need for 
distance, however elastic, temporary, revocable, that is, connected to those that 
turn out to be the transformations, the metamorphoses, of the social” (Fadini 2019, 
528). Thus, we need to always be vigilant for the situation where an institution 
loses its purpose, or becomes ineffective in responding to the particularities of 
novel situations. We need to maintain, in other words, the courage to do away 
with it and to that extent to be able to create something new against convenience, 
habit or ‘common sense’ or because its laws and norms dictate that we need to hold 
on to it even when it stifles life. 
In that sense, an institution can be said to hold a paradoxical level of 
consistency which is determined by a different understanding of how one can 
operate through an-archic nomoi [νόμοι] – if they can be called so – that are not 
reduced to a hierarchical permanent formation and set finality, since they are 
to sustain the potency to recreate their rules anew in the present; and as such 
to reorganise an institution according to the particular needs and uses before 
a specific and singular circumstance.12
We can observe an equation or, at least, a strong resonance between the 
way Deleuze opposes the law with this notion of the institution. We encounter 
11 Here, perhaps, Deleuze had in mind the work of the French jurist Maurice Hauriou, who 
thought that the institutions are more important than their laws and contract. This speculation is 
made by Dosse (2010, 113) and Tosel (2019, 145).
12 For a similar view, see: Ford 2016, 94.
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in both an opposition to the dogmatic thinking and moralisation that is promoted 
by a dominant understanding of the law as a sign of ‘progress’ of a ‘superior 
civilisation’ more generally, with institutions and nomos calling for a creative 
method of establishing and re-establishing laws and rights which are not reduced 
to any form of primary, permanent, causes or an archē. Deleuze, explicitly, 
points towards this relation between an-archic institutions and nomos, when he 
explains to Toni Negri in the the famous interview, “Control and Becoming” 
that there is “a whole order of movement in ‘institutions’ that’s independent 
of both laws and contracts” (Deleuze 1995, 169). Institutions are a matter of 
a nomos, that has nothing to do with legalistic and dogmatic rules. This nomos 
becomes, as I explain below, a matter of thinking otherwise about law and our 
nomic relation to it.
4. THE AN-ARCHIC NOMOS OF THE NOMADS
In this part, I aim to think beyond the dogmatism of the law by examining 
a thinking otherwise of the law and the creation of laws and rights, in terms of what 
Deleuze names nomos. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze refers to the practice 
of the distribution in land in its Homeric use as nomos.13 While, nomos is widely 
known as the modern Greek translation of the English word ‘law,’ according 
to Deleuze, its Homeric use significantly differs from our understanding of what 
law is or could be nowadays – “it is a nomos very different from the ‘law’”14 says 
Deleuze and Guattari (1986, 16). Following the analysis on the meanings of the 
word by the French linguist Emmanuel Laroche, Deleuze explains that nomos for 
Homeric society has a pastoral sense. For Deleuze, this meaning of allocation or 
distribution was not a matter of land distribution, because as the philosopher states 
the understanding of nomos as land-distribution was “only belatedly implied” 
(Deleuze 1994, 309). Instead, Deleuze remarks: 
Homeric society had neither enclosures nor property in pastures: it was not a question of 
distributing the land among the beasts but, on the contrary, of distributing the beasts themselves 
and dividing them up here and there across an unlimited space, forest or mountainside. The 
nomos designated first of all an occupied space, but one without precise limits (for example, 
the expanse around a town) – whence, too, the theme of the ‘nomad.’(Deleuze 1994, 309) 
13 For a brief discussion on that, see: Culp 2016, 56.
14 I should note here that probably Deleuze’s use of nomos relates to the term nomós [νομός], 
that “relates to the ‘distribution-sharing’ of land among else, rather than nómos [νόμος] as ‘law.’” 
According to Zartaloudis 2019, 140 nomós [νομός] “relates to the family of nemein/nemesthai 
[νέμειν/νέμεσθαι] with regard to a sense of a certain ‘ordering’ or distribution/sharing.” This use 
“relates to pasture and herding.” Nonetheless, since Deleuze does not distinguish between the two 
words, for the purposes of this article, I consider just his explanation to see how this understanding 
of nomos [νόμος] as a difference sense of ‘law’ calls us to think otherwise about the law.
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Here the figure of the nomad seems to counter the enclosed space – or, 
striated space in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology – as provided by the official 
laws of a society based on a so-called ‘sophisticated’ legal system and rights, for 
example, a distributor father-figure of a state apparatus or a sovereign. 
On the contrary, the nomad, in this particular sense, moves within a smooth 
space. Deleuze and Guattari crucially explain that ‘striated’ or ‘sedentary’ space 
“is counted in order to be occupied” (1986, 18–19) whereas smooth space is 
“occupied without being counted” (1986, 18). This suggests that striated space, 
faithful to the calculable or metric mentality of the state apparatus and of the 
law in the sense described earlier, calculates which entities, ideas, rights and 
modes of life are ‘fit’ to be included within the enclosed space of its boundaries of 
rightness and propertyness – according to Deleuze and Guattari, the striated space 
“measures, puts barriers, borders and hierarchises between insiders and outsiders” 
(1986, 18–19). This ‘calculation’ is operated by state’s laws and customs which have 
as a ‘measure’ the archist morality of the state apparatus and its interests – they 
act still in accordance with the model of the sovereign, superior and unparticipated 
‘judgment of God’.15 On the other hand, smooth space is a place for creation and 
invention without a predestined or pre-empted distribution of shares, laws, rights 
and so forth. It is there to be occupied and moulded accordingly, in order to serve 
particular needs and respond to a particular situation – the institution, as explained 
above, corresponds to this understanding of smooth space.
The nomads, as stated above, disorient the authority of the state apparatus 
and striated space because “such a static or striated formation of identities is 
insignificant [for them] since their constant movement ensures the dissolution of 
any form of identity that could supposedly claim any sort of purity” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1986, 18–19). Operating within a smooth, boundless space, the nomads 
are, thus, affiliated with a notion of an an-archic movement without a beginning 
or end. In that sense, the nomad proceeds in a mode of becoming, in the sense 
that one refuses to be limited by any form of transcendent, arhcist, moral, fixed 
or eternal rules, norms and identities – as such, the nomad comes to disorient the 
conformity of the obedient subject to the state.
According to Deleuze, the nomads follow a nomos which is based on an 
experience – and not an archē – of a ‘nomadic distribution’ (Deleuze 1994, 36), 
which is “a sort of crowned an-archy, that overturned hierarchy […]” (Deleuze 
1994, 41). Similarly to the operation of institutions as opposed to the law, the 
nomadic distribution functions in an open space that is unlimited, without 
predetermined beginnings or limited ends. Perhaps, the most distinctive 
characteristic of the nomads is then that they always try to slip away from the law, 
the state apparatus, its laws and rights. While, the state always tries to appropriate 
15 See how Deleuze (1998, 126–135) uses Antonin Artaud’s work to oppose a transcendent, 
judgmental mode of being.
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nomadic creativity – presenting it even as ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘innovation’ and 
‘progress’ the nomads must remain vigilant and find the line of flight to escape 
capture, and to continue to live in a creative an-archic space.16 Thus, even though 
the an-archic distribution of the nomads may, often, appear to be ‘captured’ 
within the dogmatism of law and the state apparatus, this is not the case according 
to Deleuze and Guattari: 
even though the nomadic trajectory may follow trails or customary routes, it does not fulfil 
the function of the sedentary road, which is to parcel out a closed space to people, assigning 
each person a share and regulating the communication between shares. The nomadic trajectory 
does the opposite: it distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and 
non-communicating. The nomas came to designate the law, but that was originally because it 
was distribution, a mode of distribution. It is a very special kind of distribution, one without 
division into shares, in a space without borders or enclosure. The nomas is the consistency of 
a fuzzy aggregate: it is in this sense that it stands in opposition to the law or the polis, as the 
backcountry, a mountainside, or the vague expanse around a city (“either nomos or polis”). 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1986, 50–51)
The nomos of the nomads, their distribution into space, paves the way for 
a necessarily non-juridical understanding of a non-law since it escapes the narrow 
pre-set boundaries of juridicalised hierarchy and juridical dogmatism. It is in 
that sense an-archic “akin to a dispersal [but] somewhat orderly” (Zartaloudis 
2019, 142). Akin perhaps to the way a particular logic used in, say, mapping 
a geographical territory determines also what one sees (or not). Just like the 
unmapped chaos that accompanies becoming and pure immanence, the map of 
a nomadic distribution is possible as it is still ‘consistent’ in its an-archy, and 
that enables it to expose the archist-infused law’s blackmail of the supposedly 
catastrophic results in the absence of an archē. The mapping of the laws-map is 
a ‘sham’ that permits the eternalisation of the pacifying domination in the form 
of rules disguising the a priori necessitated distinction between the ‘masters’ and 
the ‘subordinates’ and the ways in which they can each pragmatically ‘exercise’ 
their rights.
16 See: Deleuze, Guattari 1986, 22–30. Deleuze and Guattari explain how the state apparatus 
tries to appropriate nomadic science, incorporating into its royal (calculable) science. See also: 
Châtelet 2014, esp. chapter 6. Châtelet explains how the market promotes the image of a flexible 
‘nomad’ which seeks innovation and movement, all, of course, in order to serve the politics of the 
market. The nomad of the market is, often, the precarious, or worse, employed or unemployed who 
in the name of ‘innovation’ and fluidity is always vulnerable to any sort of exploitation. As Châtelet 
(2014), 75 writes: “Young nomads we love you! Be yet more modern, more mobile, more fluid, if 
you don’t want to end up like your ancestors in the muddy fields of Verdun. The Great Market is 
your draft board! Be light, anonymous, precarious like drops of water or soap bubbles: this is true 
equality, that of the Great Casino of life! If you’re not fluid, you will very quickly become losers. 
You will not be admitted into the Great Global Super Boom of the Great Market… Be absolutely 
modern (like Rimbaud), be a nomad, be fluid – or check out, like a viscous loser!”
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An an-archic nomos is, then, an ethicο-political action that aims to break the 
boundaries of the dogmatic mode of thinking and existing that is promoted with 
the law, a supposedly archist morality re-establishing the primacy of a concrete 
notion of identity, as opposed to the constant movement of becoming.17 It is a way 
to expose and to “disturb the state and the law from the outside” (Newman 2012, 
327). In that sense, it is in a constant opposition and strife against the dogmas and 
hierarchies of any state apparatus, and it should be ready to respond adequately 
to any assault coming from them. It has to possess a lethal instinct ready to destroy 
any form of dogmatism and ‘break the wheel’ of the ‘current state of af-
fairs’ (of what also leads one to say what they think but then also say ‘yet, at 
the end of the day…’), refusing to compromise and to be ‘pacified’ by any call 
for pseudo-progress and consensusualism.18 
Such a nomos is an-archic because it refuses to be subordinated by any form 
of pre-emptive hierarchising, and it refuses to prioritise a mode of being over 
another. Despite its anarchy, however, a nomos remains within its own consistency, 
in the sense that it functions by ‘(re)organising’ itself through institutions, 
or through what we can call nomoi, that are ever-changing and expressive (as 
opposed to representative) of a certain situation in question. Its ethos is an-
archic, because it operates through a mode of immanent being that does not rely 
on dogmatic, archist values, laws and rights. It is rather an immanent autonomous 
ethos, because since anyone who operates through this an-archic ethos is the cause 
and the consequence of the operation (or perhaps causes and consequences become 
so blurry that are no more). This is perhaps the heart of the creativity that can be 
found in the an-archic persona of the nomad who wants “to become worthy of 
what happens to [it], […] to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby 
to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break with one’s carnal birth […]” 
(Deleuze 2015, 149). Similarly to what Deleuze and Guattari define as becoming-
democratic,19 we can talk in this manner of a becoming-law or a becoming-right in 
this life where its ‘essence’ and its praxis are indissociable and it is this threshold 
that forms its ethos. A becoming-law or a becoming-right does not have anything 
17 For a brief discussion on the becoming of the nomads see: Sellars 2007, 34–35.
18 I am using here lethal and ‘destruction’ in similar terms to Benjamin 1986, esp. 297.
19 Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 113): “A becoming-democratic that is not the same as what 
States of law are, or even a becoming-Greek that is not the same as what the Greeks were. The 
diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is what Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as 
physician, ‘physician of civilization,’ or inventor of new immanent modes of existence. Eternal 
philosophy, but also the history of philosophy, gives way to a becoming-philosophical. What be-
comings pass through us today, which sink back into history but do not arise from it, or rather that 
arise from it only to leave it? The Aternal, the Untimely, the Actual are examples of concepts in 
philosophy; exemplary concepts.” Here, Deleuze and Guattari clarify that a ‘becoming-something’ 
does not resemble the ‘final’ or ‘identarian’ form of this or that ‘something’ but, instead, its beco-
mings hide a multiplicity of other potentialities that can be explored in perpetuity in order to form 
something new.
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to do with imitating any kind of supposedly progressive or ‘civilising’ human 
behaviour, or equally with betraying a ‘principle,’ or, indeed, with assimilating 
into a certain set ordering by once more attempting to impose itself on others (like 
the many such attempts promoted also through or in the name of/or against the law, 
laws and rights in order to rebuild soon to be again ‘civilised’ state apparatuses). 
This becoming, at a ‘personal’ level (though one that can no longer be labelled 
as such), is an ability to be attentive and open to what happens to us, to be able 
to appreciate and to be feasibly curious (and thus ready to let ourselves go and 
forget our certainties20) in order to live with the (un)known. Perhaps, one does so 
by embracing key characteristics, which define the radical ascetic virtue of all 
great philosophers, and which are, according to Deleuze, ‘humility’, ‘chastity’ 
and ‘poverty’ (Deleuze 2001, 3). It is through these fundamental but lived virtues 
that we are ready to accept and become worthy of the situations and cases that 
we are faced with – and this ability of becoming worthy of oneself is at the very 
heart of an an-archic ethos. In other words, not to be split between an ideal self 
(who believes in, say, the law) and a real self (who is unable to make ends meet or 
be equal to others).
To that extent, our failures are not to be any longer the source of renewed 
ressentiment and our success not a matter of the arrogance of accumulation and 
progress. Instead, failure and success are closely connected and are accepted as 
some of the many immanent possibilities of living. A life with this an-archic 
nomos then is able to accept and embrace its limits and ‘the exhaustion of 
possibilities’, that will make the strife begin anew, rather than fall back into the 
‘tiredness’ that bolsters ressentiment, dogmatism and archism.21 For this reason, 
everything is harder and yet more sustainable among ourselves.
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